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Abstract 
 
  
New evidence is presented on the possible existence of bi-directional causal 
relationships between public debt and economic growth in both central and peripheral 
countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union. We test for heterogeneity 
in the bi-directional Granger-causality across both time and space during the period 
between 1980 and 2013. The results suggest evidence of a “diabolic loop” between low 
economic growth and high public debt levels in Spain after 2009. For Belgium, Greece, 
Italy and the Netherlands debt has a negative effect over growth from an endogenously 
determined breakpoint and above a debt threshold ranging from 56% to 103% 
depending on the country. 
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1. Introduction 
Shambaugh (2012) pointed out that the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
countries have faced three interlocking crises (banking, sovereign debt, and economic 
growth) which together challenged the viability of the currency union. According to this 
line of thought, these crises connected with one another in several ways: the problems of 
weak banks and high sovereign debt were mutually reinforcing, and both were exacerbated 
by weak, constrained growth.  
Whilst Gómez-Puig, Sosvilla-Rivero and Singh (2015) focused on the interconnection 
between banking and sovereign debt crises in EMU countries, in this paper we will pay 
attention to the interrelationship between public debt and economic growth. The empirical 
literature on this topic not only presents ambiguous results, but is centred mainly on the 
possible impact of high debt levels on economic growth, disregarding the possibility of 
reverse causality running from growth to debt [Ferreira (2009) and Puente-Ajovín and 
Sanso-Navarro (2015) are some of the few exceptions]. However, there are some 
theoretical reasons for thinking that public debt is likely to accumulate when growth is low 
(see Bell et al., 2015). In this regard, since low growth means lower government revenue, 
governments may be forced to increase their debt levels to maintain the welfare state.  
Therefore, some kind of “diabolic loop” (see Brunnemeier et al., 2011)1 between high levels 
of debt and low levels of economic growth may have arisen with the outbreak of the 
financial crisis in most economies in 2008 (EMU countries among them). An increase in 
government debt levels both raises government deficits and changes investors’ 
expectations. On the one hand, the rise in the government deficit increases the need to 
borrow and pushes up interest rates; this, through a “crowding-out” effect on private 
                                                          
1 These authors described the development of a “diabolic loop” between sovereign and banking risk in euro area 
countries.  
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investment, may undermine economic growth. On the other, the increase in investors’ risk 
aversion may induce a “flight-to-safety” that may favour bonds of countries generally 
regarded to have a low default risk. In turn, as economic growth decreases, since 
government revenues also decline, governments are forced to increase their debt levels in 
order to maintain the welfare state (the economy’s “automatic stabilizers” may start to 
work, meaning an increase in public expenditure in social security transfers, for instance).  
The recent European debt crisis indicates open academic questions that policy makers 
might need answer to. Events of the last few years have led to increasing concern about the 
possibly adverse consequences of the substantial accumulation of public debt of EMU 
countries. The debate is currently so hotly contested, because pundits draw widely different 
conclusions for macroeconomic policy, and in particular pro and contra economic austerity 
policies. 
In this context, the main objective of this paper is to shed some additional light on this 
challenging avenue of research by applying the Granger-causality approach and 
endogenous breakpoint tests in order to analyse the evolution of bi-directional causality 
between sovereign debt and economic growth in 11 EMU countries (both central and 
peripheral) during a time period that spans from 1980 to 2013. Therefore, we will consider 
the potential heterogeneity in the bi-directional causality across both time and space 
(periods and countries). 
Although some authors have applied the Granger methodology to examine causality 
between these two variables for a group of countries member of the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) by means of panel techniques2, to our 
knowledge the bi-directional causal relationship between public debt and economic growth 
                                                          
2 Panizza and Presbitero (2014) also investigate causation (not correlation) between sovereign debt levels and economic 
growth, adopting an instrumental variable approach that captures valuation effects caused by the interaction between 
foreign currency debt and exchange rate volatility.  
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and its evolution over time has not been examined individually for each EMU country. In 
particular, in order to compare our results with those of the existing literature, our paper is 
closely related to those of Ferreira (2009) and Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015). 
However, in contrast to those studies, we do not make use of panel Granger-causality tests 
to combine the power of cross section averaging with all the subtleties of temporal 
dependence; rather, we explore the time series dimension of the issue.  Our methodology is 
data-driven and allows us to select the statistical model that best approximates the 
relationship between the variables under study for any particular country. We follow 
Ferreira (2009) regarding the need to pre-test for unit roots and cointegration (not required 
in the approach used by Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro, 2015), but we rely on direct 
estimation of individual relationships rather than on bootstrapping country-specific effects, 
as in Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015). Moreover, our approach allows the 
possible Granger-causal relationships to change during the sample period (see Gómez-Puig 
and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2014) and to determine endogenously the breakpoints in the evolution 
of those relationships, thus permitting us to evaluate them before and after such 
breakpoints. 
In our opinion, the proposed analysis is particularly relevant in an environment in which 
deleveraging policies need to be implemented in some euro area countries, but their 
beneficial effects are still a matter for debate. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents a short literature review. Section 3 explains the econometric 
methodology, and the data and empirical results are reported in Section 4. Finally, some 
concluding remarks and policy implications are provided in Section 5.   
2. Literature review 
The results from the empirical literature on the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth are far from being conclusive (see Panizza and Presbitero (2013) for a 
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survey). While the first studies [see, for example, Modigliani (1961), Diamond (1965) and 
Saint-Paul (1992)] sustained that a public debt increase always contributed to economic 
growth, more recent work has presented totally different results. Patillo et al., (2004) 
conclude that whilst low levels of public debt affect economic growth positively, high levels 
have a negative impact; Schclarek (2005) does not find any significant relation between 
public debt and economic growth in industrial countries, whereas Kumar and Woo (2010), 
controlling for other factors that also influence growth, detected an inverse relationship 
between the two variables.  
In their seminal work, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) studied economic growth for different 
thresholds of public debt using a database of 44 countries over a time period spanning 200 
years. Their results suggest that the relationship is weak for public debt ratios below 90% 
of GDP, but that, above this threshold, on average, growth rates decrease substantially.  
However, since the publication of their paper, the 90% threshold has not only been 
questioned but has also been the focus of much of the debate in the literature: see 
Cecchetti et al. (2011), Minea and Paren (2012), Presbitero (2012), Baum et al. (2012), 
Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012), Herdon et al. (2013) and Égert (2013), to name a 
few.  
Moreover, the recent global recession and sovereign debt crisis in Europe have stimulated 
an intense debate both on the effectiveness of fiscal policies and on the consequences of 
public debt increases, in a situation in which leverage is already very high in European 
economies. In this regard, Gómez-Puig (2013) attempts to quantify the total level of  
indebtedness (public and private) in all euro area countries, using a database created with 
the statistics provided by the European Central Bank. According to her calculations, total 
leverage (public and private) over GDP recorded levels of 710%, 487%, 413%, 360% and 
353%, in September 2012, in Ireland, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece respectively. 
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There is currently no consensus among economists in this area. While some suggest that 
now is precisely the time to apply the lessons learnt during the Great Depression and that 
policymakers should implement expansionary fiscal policies [see, among others, Krugman 
(2011), Berg and Ostry (2011) or DeLong and Summers (2012)]3, others argue that, since 
the high level of public sector leverage has a negative effect on economic growth, fiscal 
consolidation is fundamental to restoring confidence and improving expectations about the 
future evolution of the economy (Cochrane, 2011). The latter approach, which supports 
austerity measures, has been highly influential among the EMU authorities and has the 
support of the empirical evidence presented in some influential papers (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2010, among them).  
Nevertheless, in our reading of the empirical evidence, no strong case has yet been made 
for a causal bi-directional relationship between public debt and economic growth in EMU 
countries, taking into account not only cross-country heterogeneity in the euro area, but 
also its time-varying nature. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
3. Econometric methodology 
3.1 Testing for causality 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and 
is widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. The 
central notion is one of predictability (Hoover, 2001): one variable Granger-causes some 
other variable, given an information set, if past information about the former can improve 
the forecast of the latter based only on its own past information. Therefore, knowledge of 
the evolution of one series reduces the forecast errors of the other, suggesting that the 
latter does not evolve independently of the former.  
                                                          
3 These authors state that deleveraging policies can even prove to be detrimental, depending on the fundamental variables 
of the economy. Their argument currently receives support from some politicians in Southern Europe.  
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Testing Granger causality typically uses the same lags for all variables. This poses a 
potential problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length. Therefore, it is 
important that the lengths selected should be the right ones so as to avoid inconsistently 
estimating the model and drawing misleading inferences (see Thornton and Batten, 1985). 
In determining the optimal lag structure for each variable, we follow Hsiao’s (1981) 
sequential method to test for causality, which combines Akaike (1974)’s final predictive 
error (FPE, from now on) and the definition of Granger-causality4. Essentially, the FPE 
criterion trades off the bias that arises from under-parameterization of a model against a 
loss in efficiency resulting from its over-parameterization, thus avoiding the ambiguities of 
the conventional procedure.  
Consider the following models  
 t 0
1
m
i t i t
i
X X  

                     (1) 
0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
X X Y    
 
                                      (2)       
where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps 
are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (1), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m5. Choose the order which yields the smallest 
FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a 
manipulated variable as in (2). Compute again the FPE of (2) by varying the order 
                                                          
4 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike (1974)’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical 
techniques. 
5 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1X
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
   
where T is the total number of observations and 
SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (1) 
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of lags of Yt from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say 
n, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)6. 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) 
with the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to 
cause Xt. If FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
existence of a Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using 
the following error correction models: 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
X X  

                                      (3) 
        0 1
1 1
m n
t t i t i j t j t
i j
X Z X Y      
 
                  (4) 
where Zt is the ordinary least square (OLS) residual of the cointegrating regression 
( t tX Y   ), known as the error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I (1) 
variables, but they are not cointegrated, then β in (4) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can 
use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), 
as well as substituting expressions (1) and (2) with equations (3) and (4). Proceeding in this 
way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry and 
Mizon, 1999). 
                                                          
6 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1X
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
     
where T is the total number of observations 
and SSR is the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (2) 
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3.2 Stability Diagnostics 
In conventional Granger-causality analysis, the relationship between two variables is 
assumed to exist at all times. However, in a time period that spans more than 30 years, 
parameter non-constancy may occur (with the advent of either a financial or economic 
crisis, or due to some other kind of shock) and may generate misleading inferences if left 
undetected (see Bai and Perron, 1998, 2003; Perron, 1989; Zivot and Andrews, 1992). 
Furthermore, the pre-testing issue in early studies may have induced a size distortion of the 
resulting test procedures (Bai, 1997). Thus, it is desirable to let the data select when and 
where regime shifts occur (i. e., we need to test for the null hypothesis of no structural 
change versus the alternative hypothesis that changes are present). To this end, we first 
identify a single structural change using the Quandt–Andrews one-time unknown structural 
break test. We then use the procedure suggested by Bai (1997) and Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003) to detect multiple unknown breakpoints in order to obtain further evidence of the 
existence of the breakpoints previously detected endogenously.  
3.2.1 Quandt-Andrews Breakpoint Test 
A particular challenge in empirical time series analysis is the determination of the 
appropriate timing of a potential structural break. In a traditional Chow (1960) test7, we 
have to set a specific breakpoint based on a priori knowledge about the potential break date. 
In our analysis, however, we do not assume any prior knowledge of potential break dates, 
but use a data-based procedure to determine the most likely location of a break. In 
particular, we use the Quandt–Andrews unknown breakpoint test, originally introduced by 
Quandt (1960) and later developed by Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). 
The idea behind the Quandt-Andrews test is that a single Chow breakpoint test is 
                                                          
7 The basic idea of the breakpoint Chow test is to fit the equation separately for each subsample and to see whether there 
are significant differences in the estimated equations. A significant difference indicates a structural change in the 
relationship.  
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performed at each observation between two dates, or observations (τ1 and τ2). The k test 
statistics from those Chow tests are then summarized into one test statistic for a test 
against the null hypothesis of no breakpoints between τ1 and τ2.   
For the unknown break date, Quandt (1960) proposed likelihood ratio test statistics for an 
unknown change point, called the Supremum test, while Andrews (1993) supplied 
analogous Wald and Lagrange Multiplier test statistics for it. Andrews and Ploberger (1994) 
then developed Exponential (LR, Wald and LM) and Average (LR, Wald and LM) tests, 
calculated by using individual Chow statistics for each date in the sample, except for a 
portion trimmed from both ends. While the Supremum test finds the date that maximizes 
Chow statistics, i.e., the most likely break point, the Average and Exponential tests use all 
the Chow statistic values and provide information about the existence of the break, not 
about its date8.  
We set a search interval [0.15,0.85]   for the full sample T to allow a minimum of 15% of 
effective observations contained in both pre- and post-break periods. These tests allow us 
to determine a structural change with unknown timing endogenously from the data after 
examining each date in the data except for a portion trimmed from both ends. 
3.2.2 Multiple Breakpoint Tests 
Bai and Perron (1998) develop tests for multiple structural changes. Their methodology can 
be divided in two separate and independent parts. First, they propose a sequential method 
to identify any number of breaks in a time series, regardless of their statistical significance. 
Second, once the breaks have been identified, they propose a series of statistics to test for 
the statistical significance of these breaks, using asymptotic critical values. 
 
                                                          
8 Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994) provide tables of critical values, and Hansen (1997) provides a 
method for calculating p-values.  
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The sequential procedure is as follows: 
i. Begin with the full sample and perform a test of parameter constancy with 
unknown break. 
ii. If the test rejects the null hypothesis of constancy, determine the break date, divide 
the sample into two samples and perform single unknown breakpoint tests in each 
subsample. Add a breakpoint whenever the null is rejected in a subsample. 
iii. Repeat the procedure until none of the subsamples reject the null hypothesis, or 
until reaching the maximum number of breakpoints allowed or the maximum 
number of subsample intervals to test.  
For a specific set of unknown breakpoints 1( ,..., ) ,pT T  we use the following set of tests 
developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) to detect multiple structural breaks: the sup F 
type test, the double maximum tests, and the test for   versus 1  breaks. First, we 
consider the sup F type test with no structural breaks ( 0p ) versus the alternative 
hypothesis that there are kp   breaks. Second, we use the double maximum tests, 
UDmax and WDmax, testing the null hypothesis of no structural breaks against an 
unknown number of breaks given some upper bound m*. Finally, we study the sup 
  1TF  test, which is a sequential test of the null hypothesis of   breaks against the 
alternative of 1  breaks. The test is applied to each segment containing the observations 
1iTˆ  to iTˆ   11  ,,i . To run these tests it is necessary to decide the minimum 
distance between two consecutive breaks, h, which is obtained as the integer part of a 
trimming parameter, ε , multiplied by the number of observations T (we use 150.ε   and 
allow up to four breaks). 
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4. Data and empirical results 
4.1. Data  
We use annual data for the variables government debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(denoted DEBT) and real economic growth (measured as the percentage change of GDP 
product at constant prices, denoted by GROWTH) from 1980 to 2013 collected from the 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook Database for both EMU-11 
peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and central countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) 9. 
4.2. Preliminary results 
As a first step, we tested for the order of integration of the DEBT and GROWTH by 
means of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results, shown in Table 1, 
decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for DEBT but not for GROWTH, 
suggesting that our indicator of public debt can be treated as first-difference stationary and 
real growth as stationary10.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
Following Cheung and Chinn’s (1997) suggestion, we confirm these results using the 
Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the 
                                                          
9This distinction between central and peripheral countries has been extensively used in the empirical literature. The two 
groups we consider roughly correspond to the distinction made by the European Commission (1995) between those 
countries whose currencies continuously participated in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) from its 
inception maintaining broadly stable bilateral exchange rates among themselves over the sample period, and those 
countries whose currencies either entered the ERM later or suspended its participation in the ERM, as well as fluctuating 
in value to a great extent relative to the Deutschmark. These two groups are also roughly the same found in Jacquemin 
and Sapir (1996), applying multivariate analysis techniques to a wide set of structural and macroeconomic indicators, to 
form a homogeneous group of countries. Moreover, these two groups are basically the same that those found in 
Ledesma-Rodríguez et al. (2005) according to the perception of economic agents with respect to the commitment to 
maintain the exchange rate around a central parity in the ERM and those identifying by Sosvilla-Rivero and Morales-
Zumaquero (2012) using cluster analysis when analysing permanent and transitory volatilities of EMU sovereign yields.  
10 These results were confirmed using Phillips-Perron (1998) unit root tests controlling for serial correlation and the 
Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996) Point Optimal and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests for testing non-stationarity 
against the alternative of high persistence. These additional results are not shown here in order to save space, but they are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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alternative of a unit root. As can be seen in Table 2, the results fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity in first differences for both variables and for growth in levels, but 
reject it strongly for public debt in levels, thus giving further support to our previous 
conclusions. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Therefore, our preliminary results indicate that, on the one hand, the relevant model for 
testing for Granger-causality from (percentage change in) government debt to growth is the 
following one: 
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
GROWTH GROWH  

                (5) 
        0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
GROWTH GROWTH DEBT    
 
                 (6) 
where ∆ denotes first difference (i. e., 1t t tDEBT DEBT DEBT    ). 
On the other hand, the relevant model for testing for Granger-causality from growth to 
(percentage change in) government debt is the following one11:  
0
1
m
t i t i t
i
DEBT DEBT  

                                   (7) 
        0
1 1
m n
t i t i j t j t
i j
DEBT DEBT GROWTH    
 
                     (8) 
 
 
                                                          
11 Note that, since the variables are of different order of integration, they cannot be cointegrated and therefore there is 
not an error correction term in equations (5) to (8). Although the Granger representation theorem (Engle and Granger, 
1987) states that if two time-series are cointegrated, then there must be Granger causality between them (either one-way 
or in both directions), the converse is not true and we can still find causality between these variables. 
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4.3. Empirical results for the whole sample 
The resulting FPE statistics for the whole sample (1980-2013) are reported in Tables 3a 
and 3b.12 
 [Insert Tables 3 here] 
Tables 3a and 3b show that in two cases (Finland and France) our results suggest 
bidirectional Granger-causality; whilst in five cases (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal) we find no evidence of Granger-causality relationships in any of the 
directions. However, for the rest of the countries (Austria, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Spain) we find evidence of Granger-causality only running from the percentage change in 
sovereign debt to economic growth. The last column in Table 3 reports the static long-run 
solution obtained from the estimated dynamic results, which can be taken as an indicator 
of the impact of one variable over the other (see Hendry, 1997, Chapter 7). As can be seen 
in Table 3a, it ranges from 0.1079 to 1.2152, suggesting a positive (and in four of the six 
cases very high) effect of variations in public debt on real growth; whilst Table 3b displays 
values within the interval (0.7107, 0.8617), also indicating a positive and high impact of 
economic growth on changes in public debt-to-GDP ratios.  
Summing up, when analysing the whole sample period, we find more evidence of causality 
running from changes in government debt to growth (we find evidence of causality in 
seven out of the eleven cases studied) rather than from growth to modifications in public 
debt (for which there is empirical evidence only in the cases of Finland and France). 
However, it is important to stress that in the cases where we find evidence of Granger-
causality between these two variables, the effect is not negative but positive. This finding 
suggests that in some countries, in line with the first studies by Modigliani (1961), Diamond 
                                                          
12 These results were confirmed using both Wald statistics to test the joint hypothesis 
1 2ˆ ˆ ˆ... 0n       in equations 
(6) and (8) and the Williams-Kloot test for forecasting accuracy (Williams, 1959). These additional results are not shown 
here in order to save space, but they are available from the authors upon request.  
14 
 
(1965) or Saint-Paul (1992) which contended that a public debt increase always contributed 
to economic growth, there is evidence of a positive effect of changes in government debt 
on growth, and vice-versa.  
4.4. Empirical results allowing for structural breaks 
In order to gain further insight into the dynamic Granger-causality between the percentage 
change in the debt-to-GDP ratio and growth, we now examine the existence of breakpoints 
in causality evolution in order to analyse bi-directional Granger-causality before and after 
the detected break dates. To do so, we do not set a specific breakpoint based on a priori 
knowledge about the potential break date; we first apply the Quandt-Andrews breakpoint 
test and let the data select when regime shifts occur in each potential causal relationship, 
and later we confirm the breakpoint identified by using the tests developed by Bai and 
Perron (1998, 2003) for detecting multiple structural breaks13.  
The results of our tests for detecting breakpoints are presented in Tables 4a and 4b14. In 
particular, these tables show that in 16 out of the 22 relationships between percentage 
changes in public debt and growth (73% of the total cases), the break date takes place after 
2007 (coinciding with the beginning of the global financial crisis) and in more than a third 
of the cases (36%) it takes place in 2009 (matching the outbreak of the European debt 
crisis). The exceptions are Finland, with a break date for the causal relationship that runs 
from growth to alterations in sovereign debt in 1995 (which might be explained by the fact 
that Finland joined the European Union on 1 January 199515); Germany, with a break date 
for the causal relationship from variations in public debt to growth in 1992, and one for the 
relationship from growth to changes in the public debt-to-GDP ratio in 1990 (just after 
                                                          
13 We compute the breakpoint tests using a statistic which is robust to heteroskedasticity, since we estimate our original 
equations with Newey and West (1987) standard errors. 
14 In order to save space, the numerical results of Quandt-Andrews and Bai-Perron tests are not reported in Tables 4a and 
4b, but are available from the authors upon request. 
15 The accession of Finland to the European Union took place in a difficult economic environment after the early 1990s 
recession, but reinforced its tradition of fiscal responsibility. See Honkapohja and Koskela (1999) and OECD (2010). 
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German reunification in 1990, which led to a boom in demand and higher inflation which 
the Bundesbank countered with restrictive policy measures)16; Greece with a break point in 
the relationship that runs from differences in government debt to economic growth in 
1995 (a year identified as a turning point for the Greek economy after the Bank of Greece’s 
adoption of the “hard drachma policy”- see, for example, Bryant et al., 2001 or Trachanas 
and Katrakilidis, 201317); and Ireland, with a break date for the causal relationship that runs 
from growth to modifications in sovereign debt in 1988 (when the government debt-to-
GDP ratio reached its peak, with levels close to 110%, before the financial crisis, in a 
complex economic environment with unemployment and interest rates running into double 
figures and emigration increasing).  
Regarding the Granger-causality before and after the endogenous detected breakpoint, 
Table 4a shows that only in two countries (Ireland and Portugal) there was no evidence of 
Granger-causality between changes in public debt and growth at any point in the period, 
whilst in the case of Germany, we find evidence of a positive causal relationship between 
variations in the debt-to-GDP ratio and growth only after the break point (1992). 
Nevertheless, in the eight remaining countries causality between alterations in sovereign 
debt and economic growth decreases after the break point. In three countries (Austria, 
Finland and France), the causal relationship declines but remains positive after the break 
date; while in the case of Belgium, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain the causal 
relationship between variations in public debt and growth is positive before the break but 
becomes negative after that date.  
                                                          
16 On 18 May 1990, the two German states (the German Democratic Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany) 
signed a treaty agreeing on monetary, economic and social union. Reunification was accompanied by a massive domestic 
fiscal expansion as the Bonn government borrowed in order to rebuild East Germany and transfer income to its relatively 
poor citizens who, for their part, began to consume more and demanded higher wages.  
17 The aim of this policy, which meant that the exchange rate was used as a nominal anchor, was to improve the 
convergence of the Greek economy toward the remainder of the EU. We should recall that in 1995, the ratio of 
government debt-to-GDP reached levels close to 100% in Greece (see Figure 1b), far higher than those required by the 
Maastricht Treaty (60%, a figure that was never fulfilled). 
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With respect to the causal relationship running from growth to the percentage change in 
the public debt-to-GDP ratio (Table 4b), we found no evidence for it in any of the periods 
studied for four out of the eleven countries: Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal. In the 
remaining seven cases the evidence is mixed. While in three cases (Finland, Ireland and 
Spain) the causal relationship decreases after the break – indeed, in Finland and Spain the 
relationship between growth and variations in government debt is negative after the break 
date, suggesting that low economic growth might lead to an increase in the level of 
government debt – in the other four cases (Belgium, France, Germany and the 
Netherlands) the causal relationship between growth and the percentage change in the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio registers a positive increase after the break date detected in each 
individual country.   
Since the evidence seems much more conclusive in the relationships that run from changes 
in public debt to economic growth, we have plotted the evolution of the two variables, 
jointly with the break date in the relationship for both central and peripheral countries. 
[Insert Figures 1a and 1b here]  
If we focus our analysis on central countries (Figure 1a), we observe that in Belgium, 
variations in public debt began to Granger-cause negatively economic growth from 2009 
onwards when the debt-to-GDP ratio was around 96.5%. In the Netherlands, changes in 
government debt began to have a negative effect on growth also from 2009 onwards, when 
the debt-to-GDP reached a level of 56%.  
In the case of peripheral countries (Figure 1b), in Greece, shifts in sovereign debt have a 
negative effect on growth after 1995 when the debt-to-GDP level was close to 97%. In 
Italy, we find evidence that changes in public debt Granger-cause economic growth after 
2007 when the debt-to-GDP presented a value of 103%. Finally, in Spain, variations in 
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government debt begin to have a negative effect on real growth after 2009 with a debt-to-
GDP ratio of 53%.  
This evidence suggests that there is a negative relationship between changes in public debt 
and economic growth in five of the eleven countries studied after the detected break date, 
and that the debt threshold above which the relationship becomes negative differs 
according to the country (see Table 4a). According to our evidence, this threshold ranges 
from 53% in the case of Spain to 103% in the case of Italy. These results are highly 
significant, since they not only reinforce the idea that causality should be examined from a 
dynamic point of view, but also that a specific analysis for each country is necessary, since 
the debt threshold above which an increase in the level of indebtedness might undermine 
economic performance varies according to the economic situation of each country. 
Moreover, three of the five cases in which we found that, after an endogenously 
determined break date, variations in public debt had a negative effect on growth 
corresponded to peripheral countries: Spain (from 2009 and a debt-threshold of 53%), 
Greece (from 1995 and a debt-threshold of 97%) and Italy (from 2009 and a debt-
threshold of 103%). Therefore, these results may have important implications for 
policymakers, in a context, in which they must manage the trade-off between policies that 
might enhance growth and those that favour a deleveraging of the economy.  
Finally, it is also noticeable that growth negatively Granger-causes percentage changes in 
public debt, after an endogenously determined break date, in the case of Finland and Spain 
(see Table 4b). In particular, in the case of Spain, we might conclude that our empirical 
evidence suggests the existence of a “diabolical loop” between low economic growth (the 
threshold rate seems to be 0.9%) and high public debt levels after 2009. 
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5. Concluding remarks and policy implications 
Although the empirical literature has studied the effects of high levels of debt on economic 
growth, to our knowledge, no strong case has yet been made for a causal bi-directional 
relationship between (changes in) public debt and economic growth in EMU countries, 
taking into account not only cross-country heterogeneity in the euro area, but also its time-
varying nature. The aim of this paper was to fill this gap in the literature. In order to 
consider the potential heterogeneity in the bi-directional causality across both time and 
space (periods and countries), we applied the Granger-causality approach and endogenous 
breakpoint tests between public debt and economic growth between 1980 and 2013.  
The results for the whole sample between 1980 and 2013 are not at odds with those 
presented by other authors, but they do qualify them. As in our study, Panniza and 
Presbitero (2014) and Puente-Ajovín and Sanso-Navarro (2015) do not find negative 
causation (the latter examined Granger-causality) between sovereign debt and economic 
growth for a sample period that finishes in 2009. 
However, when we analyse Granger-causality after endogenously detecting a breakpoint 
(which, in most cases, takes place between 2007 and 2009), we find evidence of negative 
Granger-causality between changes in sovereign debt and growth in some of the countries 
studied between the break date and the end of the sample period in 2013.   
As in every empirical analysis, the results must be taken with caution since they are based 
on a set of countries over a certain period and on a given econometric methodology. 
However, our findings suggest that there is evidence of a “diabolic loop” between low 
economic growth and high public debt levels in Spain since 2009. Moreover, in the case of 
Belgium, Greece, Italy and the Netherlands, variations in public debt have a negative effect 
over growth after an endogenously determined breakpoint and above a debt threshold that 
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ranges from 56% to 103%, depending on the country18. In our opinion, these results are 
particularly relevant in an environment where, in a context of low economic growth, 
deleveraging policies need to be implemented in certain euro area countries and their 
beneficial effects are still being debated.  
Taken together, our findings argue in favour of confronting the excessive fiscal imbalances 
in three southern EMU countries that have been hit by the recent sovereign debt crisis: 
Italy, Greece, and Spain, although they still register low rates of economic growth. The 
empirical evidence suggests that an increase in the level of public indebtedness, which 
might be accompanied by a relaxation of austerity programs, may not boost economic 
growth, but increase its decline. Given the importance of these policy implications, further 
research is required to better understand and quantify the effect of public debt on 
economic growth.  
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Table 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit roots 
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences)
 ττ τµ τ
∆ATDEBT -5.5165* -5.9523* -3.5004* 
∆ATGROWTH -4.8275* -5.5223* -5.6278* 
∆BEDEBT -4.7354* -4.7354* -3.0932* 
∆BEGROWTH -6.2709* -6.2781* -6.3878* 
∆FIDEBT -4.3973* -3.7552* -3.6457* 
∆FIGROWTH -5.8645* -5.9652* -6.0526* 
∆FRDEBT -3.7576* -3.8345* -2.6467* 
∆FRGROWTH -5.8645* -5.9652* -6.0526* 
∆GEDEBT -4.4793* -3.7383* -3.3813* 
∆GEGROWTH -4.4319* -4.4899* -4.5908* 
∆GRDEBT -4.9532* -3.7961* -2.7664* 
∆GRGROWTH -4.5429* -3.6719* -2.8259* 
∆IEDEBT -4.2429** -3.7123* -2.9123* 
∆IEGROWTH -4.8589* -6.0644* -6.1605* 
∆ITDEBT -3.7833** -3.7963* -3.1035* 
∆ITGROWTH -4.5173* -4.1937* -4.8478* 
∆NLDEBT -3.5620** -3.5620* -3.4908* 
∆NLGROWTH -3.9448** -3.7223* -4.5883* 
∆PTDEBT -4.0966* -3.7279* -2.8741* 
∆PTGROWTH -4.4933* -6.6656* -6.6656* 
∆SPDEBT -4.2195** -3.7041* -2.9487* 
∆SPGROWTH -3.6423** -3.0983** -2.2242* 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) (Variables in levels)
 ττ τµ τ 
ATDEBT -0.0148 -1.7545 -0.7251 
ATGROWTH -4.6447* -4.4038* -2.7344* 
BEDEBT -2.3981 -1.5461 -0.4637 
BEGROWTH -5.1290* -5.1264* -3.0833* 
FIDEBT -2.4141 -1.5271 0.5305 
FIGROWTH -3.6080** -3.6903* -3.0197* 
FRDEBT -2.5228 0.1262 0.1556 
FRGROWTH -3.6080** -3.6903* -3.0197* 
GEDEBT -2.1846 -1.1390 0.7117 
GEGROWTH -4.6796* -4.3525* -3.0034* 
GRDEBT -1.5890 -2.0141 -1.2151 
GRGROWTH -3.9533** -3.1896** -2.7664* 
IEDEBT -2.2343 -2.5767 -0.4025 
IEGROWTH -4.2246** -3.9278* -2.6827* 
ITDEBT -2.4291 -1.9253 0.1092 
ITGROWTH -4.3374* -3.7448* -2.8070* 
NLDEBT -2.3467 -2.4335 1.1712 
NLGROWTH -3.5489** -3.2692** -2.8502* 
PTDEBT -1.6685 -2.0674 0.8641 
PTGROWTH -3.6980** -3.6563* -2.7231* 
SPDEBT -2.3666 -1.5221 0.5903 
SPGROWTH -3.9545** -3.2041** -2.8797* 
Notes:  
The ADF statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of a unit root. 
ττ, τμ and τ denote the ADF statistics with drift and trend, with drift, and without drift respectively.  
* denotes significance at the 1% level. Critical values based on MacKinnon (1996) 
∆ denotes first difference. AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 2. KPSS tests for stationarity  
Panel A: I (2) versus I (1) (Variables in first differences)
  ττ τµ 
∆ATDEBT  0,1032 0.3314 
∆ATGROWTH  0.0986 0.2828 
∆BEDEBT  0.1042 0.3168 
∆BEGROWTH  0.1012 0,2495 
∆FIDEBT  0.0751 0.0826 
∆FIGROWTH  0.1037 0.3077 
∆FRDEBT  0.1118 0.1452 
∆FRGROWTH  0.0539 0.1583 
∆GEDEBT  0.0547 0,0524 
∆GEGROWTH  0.0767 0.3134 
∆GRDEBT  0.1111 0.2116 
∆GRGROWTH  0.0474 0.1592 
∆IEDEBT  0.0971 0.2116 
∆IEGROWTH  0.0574 0.1592 
∆ITDEBT  0.1018 0.2036 
∆ITGROWTH  0.0913 0.3312 
∆NLDEBT  0.1078 0.2484 
∆NLGROWTH  0.0798 0.3141 
∆PTDEBT  0.1066 0.3395 
∆PTGROWTH  0.0395 0.0382 
∆SPDEBT  0.1067 0.1297 
∆SPGROWTH  0.0893 0.1967 
Panel B: I (1) versus I (0) (Variables in levels)
  ττ τµ 
ATDEBT  0.2291 0.4955** 
ATGROWTH  0.1055 0.1925 
BEDEBT  0.6051* 0.5863** 
BEGROWTH  0.1027 0.2536 
FIDEBT  0.2295* 0.5320** 
FIGROWTH  0.0904 0.1580 
FRDEBT  0.2660* 0.6803** 
FRGROWTH  0.0943 0.2691 
GEDEBT  0.1653** 0.7547** 
GEGROWTH  0.1012 0.1754 
GRDEBT  0.2917* 0.7463* 
GRGROWTH  0.1153 0.1724 
IEDEBT  0.2483* 0.6771** 
IEGROWTH  0.1045 0.1766 
ITDEBT  0.1568** 0.5927 
ITGROWTH  0.1023 0.1725 
NLDEBT  0.2282* 0.5082** 
NLGROWTH  0.1012 0.2674 
PTDEBT  0.1529** 0.5661** 
PTGROWTH  0.0993 0.2502 
SPDEBT  0.1968** 0.4650** 
SPGROWTH  0.1054 0.1967 
 
Notes:  
The KPSS statistic is a test for the null hypothesis of stationarity.  
ττ and τμ denote the KPSS statistics with drift and trend, and with drift respectively * denotes significance at the 1% level. 
Critical values based on MacKinnon (1996). 
∆ denotes first difference. AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
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Table 3a. FPE statistics, all sample (∆Debt → Growth) 
 FPE(m.0) FPE(m.n) Causality Impact
∆ATDEBT → ATGROWTH 3.6192 (1.0) 3.4518 (1.2) Yes 1.2152 
∆BEDEBT → BEGROWTH 3.4085 (2.0) 3.4521 (2.1) No  
∆FIDEBT → FIGROWTH 10.5553 (1.0) 9.1998 (1.1) Yes 0.1079 
∆FRDEBT → FRGROWT 2.6149 (1.0) 2.2787 (1.2) Yes 0.7259 
∆GEDEBT → GEGROWTH 5.5113 (1.0) 5.6604 (1.1) No  
∆GRDEBT → GRGROWTH 5.8721 (1.0) 6.2241 (1.1) No  
∆IEDEBT → IEGROWTH 9.3414 (1.0) 9.7624 (1.1) No  
∆ITDEBT → ITGROWTH 3.8557 (1.0) 3.3013 (1.1) Yes 0.4256 
∆NLDEBT → NLGROWTH 3.4411 (1.0) 2.8179 (1.2) Yes 0.7021 
∆PTDEBT → PTGROWTH 4.9873 (1.0) 5.3018 (1.1) No  
∆SPDEBT → SPGROWTH 3.0333 (1.0) 3.0098 (1.1) Yes 0.7866 
 
 
Table 3b. FPE statistics, all sample (Growth → ∆Debt) 
 FPE(m.0) FPE(m.n) Causality Impact
  ATGROWTH → ∆ATDEBT 8.9099 (1.0) 9.5225 (1.1) No  
  BEGROWTH → ∆BEDEBT 10.7905(1.0) 11.3556 (1.1) No  
FIGROWTH → ∆FIDEBT 14.2982 (2.0) 13.9998 (2.1) Yes 0.7107 
  FRGROWTH → ∆FRDEBT 7.2823 (1.0) 7.0749 (1.1) Yes 0.8617 
  GEGROWTH → ∆GEDEBT 4.0397 (1.0) 4.9406 (1.1) No  
  GRGROWTH → ∆GRDEBT 8.7370 (1.0) 9.2978 (1.1) No  
  IEGROWTH → ∆IEDEBT 4.3576 (1.1) 4.6364 (1.1) No  
  ITGROWTH → ∆ITDEBT 3.7730 (1.0) 4.2267 (1.1) No  
  NLGROWTH → ∆NLDEBT 4.9931 (1.0) 5.9658 (1.1) No  
  PTGROWTH → ∆PTDEBT 3.3260 (1.0) 3.7053 (1.1) No  
  SPGROWTH → ∆SPDEBT 6.8209 (1.0) 7.8151 (1.1) No  
Notes:  
The figures in brackets are the optimum order of lags in each pair of countries 
Impact shows the static long-run solution 
∆ denotes first difference. AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
Bold values indicate the presence of Granger-causality. 
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Table 4a Causality analysis by sub-periods (∆Debt → Growth) 
 Before the break After the break Break date Debt threshold
∆ATDEBT → ATGROWTH Yes (0.7086) Yes (0.3054) 2009 
∆BEDEBT → BEGROWTH No Yes (-0.3288) 2009 96.5%
∆FIDEBT → FIGROWTH Yes (0.6651) Yes (0.3065) 2008 
∆FRDEBT → FRGROWTH Yes (0.9652) Yes (0.1273) 2009 
∆GEDEBT → GEGROWTH No Yes (0.3439) 1992 
∆GRDEBT → GRGROWTH Yes (0.1900) Yes (-0.7222) 1995 97%
∆IEDEBT → IEGROWTH No No 2008 
∆ITDEBT → ITGROWTH Yes (0.5270) Yes (-0.1508) 2007 103%
∆NLDEBT → NLGROWTH Yes (2.3476) Yes (-0.1063) 2009 56%
∆PTDEBT → PTGROWTH No No 2008 
∆SPDEBT → SPGROWTH Yes (2.8895) Yes (-0.1074) 2009 53%
 
 
 
Table 4b Causality analysis by sub-periods (Growth → ∆Debt) 
 Before the break After the break Break date Growth threshold
  ATGROWTH → ∆ATDEBT No No 2009 
  BEGROWTH → ∆BEDEBT No Yes (4.2152) 2008 
  FIGROWTH → ∆FIDEBT Yes (0.4863) Yes (-0.2060) 1995 4%
  FRGROWTH → ∆FRDEBT Yes (0.4127) Yes (6.3966) 2007 
  GEGROWTH → ∆GEDEBT No Yes (0.7742) 1990 
  GRGROWTH → ∆GRDEBT No No 2009 
  IEGROWTH → ∆IEDEBT Yes (3.3019) No 1988 
  ITGROWTH → ∆ITDEBT No No 1995 
  NLGROWTH → ∆NLDEBT No Yes (1.4729) 2008 
  PTGROWTH → ∆PTDEBT No No 2009 
  SPGROWTH → ∆SPDEBT No Yes (-12.3380) 2008 0.9%
 
Notes:  
The figures in brackets are the estimated long-run solutions 
∆ denotes first difference.  AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. 
Bold values indicate Granger-causality. 
Bold italic values indicate new Granger-causality not detected in the whole sample. 
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Figure 1. Debt-to-GDP, Growth and breakpoint for the relationship running from 
∆debt to growth. 
 
Figure 1a. EMU Central Countries: 1980-2013 
 
Notes: Debt-to-GDP ratios (left scale) and real GDP growth (right scale). 
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Figure 1b. EMU Peripheral Countries: 1980-2013 
 
                                                
Notes: Debt-to-GDP ratios (left scale) and real GDP growth (right scale). 
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